American University Law Review
Volume 63 | Issue 6

Article 6

2014

The Exception That Doesn't Prove the Rule: Why
Congress Should Narrow ENDA's Religious
Exemption to Protect the Rights of LGBT
Employees
Julie Dabrowski
American University Washington College of Law

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/aulr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Dabrowski, Julie. "The Exception That Doesn't Prove the Rule: Why Congress Should Narrow ENDA's Religious Exemption to Protect
the Rights of LGBT Employees." American University Law Review 63, no.6 (2014): 1957-1984.

This Notes & Casenotes is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @
American University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in American University Law Review by an authorized administrator
of Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact fbrown@wcl.american.edu.

The Exception That Doesn't Prove the Rule: Why Congress Should
Narrow ENDA's Religious Exemption to Protect the Rights of LGBT
Employees

This notes & casenotes is available in American University Law Review: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/aulr/vol63/iss6/6

DABROWSKI.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

11/7/2014 12:38 PM

NOTE
THE EXCEPTION THAT DOESN’T
PROVE THE RULE: WHY CONGRESS
SHOULD NARROW ENDA’S RELIGIOUS
EXEMPTION TO PROTECT THE RIGHTS
OF LGBT EMPLOYEES
JULIE DABROWSKI*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction .......................................................................................1958
I. Background .............................................................................1960
A. Religious Employers and the First Amendment .............1960
B. The Origins of ENDA and Its Religious Exemption .......1966
1. Overview and legislative history .................................1966
2. ENDA’s religious exemption ......................................1968
II. ENDA’s Religious Exemption Should Allow Discrimination
Only in Cases Where an Employer’s First Amendment
Rights Are Implicated .............................................................1971
A. ENDA’s Religious Exemption Is Overbroad Because
It Allows Discrimination Irrespective of an Employer’s
Religious Beliefs or Its Employee’s Role in Conveying
Those Beliefs ....................................................................1971
B. Congress Should Amend ENDA’s Religious Exemption
to Allow Employers to Discriminate Only in Cases
Where Employees Would Be Exempt From Coverage
Under the Ministerial Exception .....................................1978
Conclusion .........................................................................................1984
* Articles Editor, American University Law Review, Volume 63; Alumna, 2014,
American University Washington College of Law; B.A., Political Science and English, 2008,
Tulane University. I am grateful to Professor Susan Carle for her invaluable guidance
and insights; to Professor William Yeomans and Professor Richard Ugelow for their
advice and helpful input; to the talented and hardworking staff of the American
University Law Review; and to my friends and family for their constant love and support.

1957

DABROWSKI.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

11/7/2014 12:38 PM

1958

[Vol. 63:1957

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

INTRODUCTION
The current state of protections for lesbian, gay, bisexual, and
transgender (LGBT) employees in the workplace is far from
adequate. Anywhere from 15–40% of gay and lesbian employees and
nearly 90% of transgender employees have experienced
discrimination or harassment at some point in their careers.1 Yet victims
of discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity must
navigate a patchwork of federal, state, and local laws and regulations
that often provide insufficient or no protection for employees.2
The Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA) would remedy
this inadequate regulatory scheme by creating a national standard of
LGBT protection that prohibits employers from discriminating on
the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity. ENDA would
provide employees with recourse for their employers’ discriminatory
decisions regarding hiring and firing or wages, as well as any
workplace harassment or other discriminatory treatment regarding
the terms and conditions of employment.3 An overwhelming majority
of Americans support a federal law banning such discrimination,4
and ENDA has received bipartisan support in Congress.5

1. Jeff Krehely, Polls Show Huge Public Support for Gay and Transgender Workplace
Protections, CENTER FOR AM. PROGRESS (June 2, 2011), http://www.americanprogress.org
/issues/lgbt/news/2011/06/02/9716/polls-show-huge-public-support-for-gay-andtransgender-workplace-protections (noting that 44% of transgender individuals
missed a job opportunity because of their status, while 26% percent lost a job and
23% lost a promotion). See generally Stuart Biegel, Unfinished Business: The Employment
Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA) and the K-12 Education Community, 14 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. &
PUB. POL’Y 357, 367 (2011) (documenting the history of discrimination against LGBT
employees, both within the education sector and in the workplace generally).
2. Non-Discrimination Laws: State by State Information—Map, AM. C.L. UNION,
https://www.aclu.org/maps/non-discrimination-laws-state-state-information-map
(last visited Aug. 3, 2014) (mapping the various levels of LGBT protections offered
under state non-discrimination laws). Though many states, including California and
Washington, protect LGBT employees from discrimination based on sexual
orientation and gender identity, a majority of states provide no LGBT discrimination
protections. Three states, including New York and New Hampshire, prohibit
discrimination based on sexual orientation but not gender identity. Id.
3. S. 815, 113th Cong. § 4(a) (2013).
4. Maggie Haberman, Poll: Big Support For AntiDiscrimination Law, POLITICO
(Sept. 20, 2013, 5:05 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2013/09/poll-big-supportfor-anti-discrimination-law-97540.html (citing a poll by TargetPoint Consulting in
conjunction with the Americans for the Workplace Opportunity campaign indicating
that 68% of registered voters across the country support federal legislation to protect
LGBT Americans from workplace discrimination, including 56% of Republicans).
5. See, e.g., Ed O’Keefe, Who Voted For the Employment Non-Discrimination Act?,
WASH. POST (Nov. 7, 2013, 4:43 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/thefix/wp/2013/11/07/who-voted-for-the-employment-non-discrimination-act
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Critics of the bill argue, however, that antidiscrimination laws
infringe on First Amendment rights when unaccompanied by
exemptions for faith-based organizations with religiously-grounded
objections to the conduct the antidiscrimination laws seek to protect.6
These critics argue that under ENDA, religious organizations that
object to homosexuality and transgenderism could be forced to
employ individuals whose conduct is opposed to the organizations’
religious missions and beliefs.7 This criticism has led Congress to
include a broad religious exemption allowing organizations that
qualify as religious employers to discriminate against LGBT
employees without regard to any of ENDA’s provisions.8
This Note seeks to make sense of ENDA’s religious exemption,
which is significantly broader than the religious exemption included
in Title VII. It recommends narrowing the scope of ENDA’s
exemption to provide more comprehensive protections to LGBT
employees while simultaneously safeguarding employers’ First
Amendment rights. Part I provides background on both Title VII
and ENDA and their respective religious exemptions, which,
although seemingly identical, apply to very different groups of
employees. Part II argues that ENDA’s religious exemption is
overbroad because it allows religious employers to discriminate
against LGBT employees even in cases where the discrimination is
not based on a religiously-grounded objection.
Because the
exemption provides employers with protection beyond that which is
necessary to safeguard their First Amendment rights, it fails to
appropriately balance the protection of religious freedom and the
individual rights of LGBT employees. Part III recommends that
Congress amend ENDA’s religious exemption to allow religious
(describing the breakdown of the U.S. Senate vote to pass ENDA, which included ten
Republicans in favor of the bill).
6. Steven H. Aden & Stanley W. Carlson-Thies, Catch or Release? The Employment
Non-Discrimination Act’s Exemption for Religious Organizations, 11 ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST
SOC’Y PRAC. GROUPS, no. 2, Sept. 2010, at 4.
7. See, e.g., id. (contending that anti-discrimination laws such as ENDA are
themselves discriminatory if they do not provide exemptions for employers with
religiously-grounded objections to homosexual conduct because they would require
religious organizations “to affirm conduct that is in diametric opposition to the
moral principles of their faith”); Religious Activist Group Says ENDA Would Discriminate
Against Christians, TAMPA BAY TIMES, http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter
/statements/2013
/dec/16/traditional-values-coalition/religious-activist-group-saysenda-would-discrimin (last visited Aug. 15, 2014) (discussing the Traditional Values
Coalition’s claim that ENDA “discriminates against Christian daycare, Christian
parents, Christian business owners, and the rights of religious freedom” because it
does not provide an exemption for secular companies and organizations that are run
by “committed Christians”).
8. S. 815 § 6; see infra Part II.A (describing ENDA’s broad religious exemption
and its failure to safeguard the rights of LGBT employees).
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employers to discriminate against only those employees who fall
under Title VII’s ministerial exception, which allows religious
organizations the freedom to discriminate in the hiring and firing of
employees who publicly represent the religious views of the
organization. This Note concludes by explaining how the proposed
amendment, though an imperfect response to the gap in coverage
for LGBT employees, will provide an acceptable balance between
protecting the individual rights of LGBT employees and the religious
freedom of their employers.
I.

BACKGROUND

A. Religious Employers and the First Amendment
The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution gives religious
employers the power to make religiously-based employment decisions
free from government interference.9 The Amendment states that
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”10 The first clause of the
Amendment, known as the Establishment Clause, prohibits the
government from establishing a national religion or giving
preference to one religion over another.11 Accordingly, a statute
violates the Establishment Clause if it favors employers or employees
of a particular religion, or favors religious employees over nonreligious employees.12 The Amendment’s Second clause, known as
the Free Exercise Clause, requires that laws provide individuals and
organizations with the freedom to exercise their religion without
excessive government interference.13 Courts have interpreted the
9. U.S. CONST. amend. I, cls. 1–2.
10. Id. amend. I, cl. 1.
11. Id.
12. See, e.g., Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 709 (1985) (holding
that a Connecticut statute violated the Establishment Clause where it provided
Sabbath observers with an absolute and unqualified right not to work on their
Sabbath, thereby “command[ing] that Sabbath religious concerns automatically
control . . . all secular interests at the workplace”). Beyond the plain text of the
Establishment Clause, the Clause has been interpreted to ensure that neither a state
nor the federal government can, among other things, affiliate itself with any religious
doctrine; pass laws that aid any particular religion; indicate a preference for religion
to irreligion, or vice versa; or force a person to profess a belief or disbelief in any
religion. 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 753 (2005). The Clause is intended to protect
against the support and involvement of the government in religious activity. Id.
13. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. E.E.O.C., 132 S.
Ct. 694, 706 (2012) (holding that, because the Free Exercise Clause “protects a
religious group’s right to shape its own faith and mission through its appointments,”
the government is prohibited from involving itself in selection of church ministers);
Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.,
724 F.3d 377, 388 (3d Cir. 2013), rev’d sub nom. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,
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Free Exercise Clause narrowly to require religious organizations to
follow neutral and generally applicable employment laws such as
Title VII.14 The Free Exercise Clause does not require an exemption
from any governmental program unless inclusion in the program
would prevent an organization from freely exercising its religion.15
Courts have made a number of efforts to reconcile Title VII and
other antidiscrimination laws16 with the Free Exercise Clause in order
to provide religious organizations with more freedom from
government interference.
The judicially created “ministerial
exception” affords religious organizations free rein to select clergy
without regard to any of Title VII’s protections.17 While courts of
appeals have recognized a ministerial exception since the passage of
Title VII,18 it was not until 2012, in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran
Church and School v. E.E.O.C., that the U.S. Supreme Court first
No. 13-354 (U.S. June 30, 2014) (holding that a secular, for-profit corporation
cannot engage in the “exercise of religion” under the Free Exercise Clause); Elane
Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 77 (N.M. 2013) (determining that the
New Mexico Human Rights Act does not violate the Free Exercise clause because its
exemptions, which are common to a variety of laws, do not prefer secular conduct
over religious conduct and do not evince any hostility toward religion).
14. See Vigars v. Valley Christian Ctr., 805 F. Supp. 802, 809 (N.D. Cal. 1992)
(quoting Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878
(1990), superseded by statute, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2012), as recognized in Burwell v.
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., No. 13-354, slip op. at 3-4 (U.S. June 30, 2014)) (stating
that free exercise claims will “fail if prohibiting the exercise of religion . . . is not the
object of the [law] but merely the incidental effect of a generally applicable and
otherwise valid provision. . .” (alterations in original) (internal quotations omitted));
see also Smith, 494 U.S. at 890 (finding that because states are not required to
accommodate otherwise illegal acts done to further religious beliefs, a state could deny
unemployment benefits to a person fired for using peyote as part of a religious ritual).
15. E.g., Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 303–04
(1985) (holding that a church is not exempt from minimum wage and
recordkeeping requirements because its religious objection is not to receiving any
form of wages, but rather to receiving cash wages, which the law does not require).
16. See infra notes 37–38 (discussing antidiscrimination laws that have augmented
Title VII by extending its protections to other minority groups).
17. See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 709 (holding that a “called” teacher was
a “minister” covered by the ministerial exception, which is grounded in the First
Amendment and which bars government interference with the internal governance
of the church); McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 560–61 (5th Cir. 1972)
(determining that Congress, in enacting Title VII, did not intend to allow the
government to interfere in the relationship between a church and its ministers even
though the statute did not state specifically that ministers were protected).
18. See, e.g., Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198, 209 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that a
priest’s race discrimination claim was barred by a “ministerial exception” based on
his religious duties and the nature of his dismissal); Natal v. Christian & Missionary
Alliance, 878 F.2d 1575, 1578 (1st Cir. 1989) (exempting a not-for-profit religious
corporation from the requirements of anti-discrimination laws on the grounds that
“a religious organization’s fate is inextricably bound up with those whom it entrusts
with the responsibilities of preaching its word and ministering to its adherents”). The
ministerial exception has also been applied outside of the Title VII context. See, e.g.,
Dayner v. Archdiocese of Hartford, 23 A.3d 1192, 1210 (Conn. 2011) (finding that the
ministerial exception applied to bar a school principal’s contract and tort law claims).
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acknowledged the validity of this exception.19 In doing so, the Court
reasoned that depriving the church of the power to select those who
would personify its religious beliefs—a matter that is “strictly
ecclesiastical”—violates the First Amendment.20
Although the
ministerial exception covers all employers deemed to be religious
corporations for purposes of Title VII,21 it appears to except only the
hiring and firing of religious leaders and does not allow employers to
discriminate with regard to the terms and conditions of employment.22
In applying the ministerial exception, the Supreme Court has
declined to “adopt a rigid formula for deciding when an employee
qualifies as a minister.”23 Instead, it considers all “circumstances
of . . . employment,” including the employee’s formal title, whether
the employee identifies him or herself as a minister, and whether and
how much the employee engages in religious functions as part of his
or her employment.24 The employee’s job title is not controlling, nor
is the fact that an employee performs work that is primarily religious
or primarily secular in nature.25

19. See Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 705 (stating that the ministerial exception
“precludes application of [employment] legislation to claims concerning the
employment relationship between a religious institution and its ministers”).
20. Id. at 709 (citing Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox
Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94, 119 (1952)); see id. at 697 (“Requiring a church to
accept or retain an unwanted minister, or punishing a church for failing to do so,
intrudes upon more than a mere employment decision . . . [it] interferes with the
internal governance of the church, depriving the church of control over the
selection of those who will personify its beliefs.”).
21. See infra notes 40–46 and accompanying text (explaining how the courts have
interpreted the term “religious corporation”).
22. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 703 (“The Establishment Clause prevents the
Government from appointing ministers, and the Free Exercise Clause prevents it
from interfering with the freedom of religious groups to select their own.” (emphasis
added)); see CYNTHIA BROUGHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22745, RELIGION AND THE
WORKPLACE: LEGAL ANALYSIS OF TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 AS IT
APPLIES TO RELIGION AND RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS 4 (2011) (explaining that the
ministerial exemption reconciles Title VII with the Establishment Clause because it
allows churches to freely select their own clergy without endorsing discrimination as
a basis for wage and compensation determinations).
23. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 707; see, e.g., Cannata v. Catholic Diocese of
Austin, 700 F.3d 169, 177 (5th Cir. 2012) (holding that the music director and pianist
at a church was covered by the ministerial exception because he served an integral role
at church services and helped to convey the church’s message to its congregation).
24. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 707; see CYNTHIA BROUGHER, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., RS22745, RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT UNDER TITLE VII OF THE
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 5 (2013) (breaking down the Court’s considerations
concerning whether an employee qualifies as a minister into four factors: formal title,
substantive actions, understanding and use of the title, and religious functions performed).
25. See Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 708–09 (holding that a title alone cannot
“automatically ensure coverage” and that, although the amount of time an employee
spends on secular duties is relevant to determining whether that employee is a
minister, “that factor cannot be considered in isolation”).
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Title VII’s exemptions for religiously-grounded hiring provide
another means of tempering the statute’s effect on religious
organizations.
Its exemptions allow religious employers to
discriminate in the hiring and firing of employees whose religious
beliefs do not align with those of the organization. For example,
under Title VII, a Catholic organization would be free to hire only
individuals who hold themselves out as Catholic, regardless of
whether those individuals will serve in a ministerial capacity.26
Proponents argue that Title VII’s exemptions ensure the autonomy of
churches and faith-based organizations.27 The Supreme Court has
held that shielding religious expression from antidiscrimination laws
“is crucial in preventing the majority from imposing its views on
groups that would rather express other, perhaps unpopular, ideas,”
including those regarding homosexuality and transgenderism.28 Title
VII’s religious exemptions thus seek to bring the statute into accord
with the First Amendment.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination by
covered employers on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, and
national origin.29 It applies to federal, state, and local governments,
as well as private employers with fifteen or more employees.30 With
limited exceptions,31 Title VII applies only to employees who receive
monetary compensation for their work.32 Over time, Title VII has
been augmented by legislation prohibiting discrimination on the
basis of pregnancy33, age,34 and disability.35
26. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, NOTICE NO. N-915.016, RELIGIOUS
ORGANIZATION EXEMPTION UNDER TITLE VII ¶ 235(1987).
27. See infra Part I.B (describing Title VII’s religious exemptions for religiously
grounded hiring in depth).
28. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 647–48, 656 (2000) (upholding the
right of the Boy Scouts to dismiss an openly gay scoutmaster because his presence
affected the group’s ability to advocate its viewpoints).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012).
30. Id. § 2000e(b).
31. See O’Connor v. Davis, 126 F.3d 112, 116 (2d Cir. 1997) (differentiating the
case at hand, where the Court held that an intern who did not receive compensation
for her work was not covered by Title VII, from Haavistola v. Cmty. Fire Co. of Rising
Sun, Inc., 6 F.3d 211, 221–22 (4th Cir. 1993), where the Fourth Circuit found that a
volunteer firefighter who did not receive monetary remuneration but did receive
indirect economic remuneration through a disability pension, survivors’ benefits for
dependents, life insurance, and other benefits, was protected by Title VII).
32. See, e.g., id. at 119 (finding the plaintiff-intern outside Title VII’s
protections because she received federal work study funding from her school,
rather than her employer, and did not receive any employee benefits, such as
health insurance or vacation time).
33. Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)).
34. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat.
602 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634).
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Title VII allows private religious employers to discriminate in the
hiring of employees whose religious beliefs do not align with those of
the employer.36 It includes two separate exemptions: a general
exemption for religious employers37 and a more specific exemption
for religious educational institutions.38 These exemptions derive
from the First Amendment principles of free exercise and separation
of church and state and serve as a check on Congress’s power to
restrict private entities from freely engaging in religious affairs.39
The first provision of Title VII’s religious exemption applies
specifically to religious employers’ religiously-grounded hiring and
firing decisions.40 The provision states that Title VII
shall not apply to an employer with respect to . . . a religious corporation, association, educational institution, or society with respect
to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association, educational institution, or society of its activities.41

The statute does not explicitly define “religious corporation,” and
courts have broadly interpreted the phrase to include places of
worship, religious educational institutions, and not-for-profit
organizations with clear religious affiliations.42 Although courts have
35. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12117). Amending the iconic Civil
Rights Act is no small feat. After several failed attempts to do so, LGBT advocates
have chosen to instead push for the passage of ENDA as an alternate means of
providing equal rights to LGBT employees. See Jennifer S. Hendricks, Instead of
ENDA, a Course Correction for Title VII, 103 NW. U.L. REV. COLLOQUY 209, 209–10, 212–
15 (2008) (describing these failed attempts and explaining that proponents thought
they would have a better chance at passing separate legislation). ENDA, unlike Title
VII, does not include a means for bringing disparate impact claims and does not
address affirmative action. Id.
36. Federal, state, and local governments are not covered under this exemption,
since they may not, in accordance with the Establishment Clause, have any religious
affiliation. See U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 1; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303
(1940) (declaring that the “fundamental concept of liberty embodied in [the
Fourteenth] Amendment” includes the liberty guaranteed by the First Amendment,
thereby applying the Establishment Clause against the states to prohibit them from
establishing a state religion).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) (2012).
38. Id. § 2000e-2(e).
39. See supra Part I.A (discussing the relationship between the First Amendment
and employment discrimination legislation).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a).
41. Id.
42. See, e.g., Saeemodarae v. Mercy Health Servs., 456 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1037
(N.D. Iowa 2006) (holding that a Catholic hospital was exempt from the
requirements of Title VII because it was religious in both “nature” (because the
Catholic church supported and controlled it) and “atmosphere” (due to the regular
practice of religious services and the fact that the building was “permeated with
religious overtones”)); Gosche v. Calvert High Sch., 997 F. Supp. 867, 871 (N.D.
Ohio 1998), aff’d, 181 F.3d 101 (1999) (allowing a Catholic school to terminate a
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declined to apply the exemption to non-church affiliated
organizations whose owners have strongly held religious beliefs, the
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.43
could prompt a broader interpretation where a closely held
corporation can show that it has a sincerely held religious objection
to Title VII.44 In addition, courts have literally interpreted the
exemption to include all activities of religious organizations as
opposed to solely those activities that directly involve the exercise of
religion.45 Although an organization that qualifies under the
religious exemption is free to discriminate on the basis of religion in
all hiring and firing decisions, it may not discriminate based on
membership in any other class protected by Title VII.46
The second provision of Title VII’s religious exemption is more
specific in nature: it allows religious educational institutions to take
religious affiliation into account in the hiring and firing of personnel.
The provision states:
[I]t shall not be an unlawful employment practice for a school, college, university, or other educational institution or institution of
learning to hire and employ employees of a particular religion if
[the institution] . . . is . . . owned, supported, controlled, or manteacher for engaging in an adulterous relationship on the theory that a religious
organization could condition continued employment on conformity to the religious
standards of the church); EEOC v. Presbyterian Ministries, Inc., 788 F. Supp. 1154,
1155, 1157 (W.D. Wash. 1992) (exempting from the protections of Title VII a
Christian retirement home whose employee manual stated that “[e]mployees shall
be persons who acknowledge the Christian purposes of Presbyterian Ministries, Inc.
and agree to abide by and support them”).
43. No. 13-354 (U.S. June 30, 2014).
44. See infra notes 107–08 (discussing the Hobby Lobby decision and its
implications for federal antidiscrimination laws like ENDA); Jillian T. Weiss, The First
Amendment Right to Free Exercise of Religion, Nondiscrimination Statutes Based on Sexual
Orientation and Gender Identity, and the Free Exercise Claims of Non-Church-Related
Employers, 12 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 15, 46 (2010) (explaining that non-religious
employers may not raise the Free Exercise Clause as a defense to neutral, generally
applicable laws such as those prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation
and gender identity).
45. See, e.g., Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latterday Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 339–40 (1987) (holding that a religiously affiliated
non-profit organization may make employment decisions based on religion without
violating the Establishment Clause, even if those decisions relate to nonreligious
activities of the organization). But see Duane E. Okamoto, Religious Discrimination and
the Title VII Exemption for Religious Organizations: A Basic Values Analysis for the Proper
Allocation of Conflicting Rights, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1375, 1377–79 (1987) (suggesting that
there may be exceptions to the rule that Title VII exempts all activities of a religious
organization because “neither the Act nor its judicial interpretation has provided a
clear, definitive, or consistent standard concerning religious organizations’ statutory
liberty to discriminate in employment”).
46. See BROUGHER, RELIGION AND THE WORKPLACE, supra note 22, at 3 (explaining
that an exempt religious organization can still violate Title VII if it considers an
employee’s sex, race, color, or national origin).
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aged by a particular religion or by a particular religious [organization] . . . or if the curriculum of such school, college, university, or
other educational institution or institution of learning is directed
toward the propagation of a particular religion.47

Courts have generally required that religious organizations pass
either a “control” test or a “curriculum” test to show that they fall
under this provision.48 However, there is a limited amount of case
law pertaining to the provision, in part because of its redundancy
with the religious exemption’s first provision, which lists “religious
educational institutions” as one type of religious organization.49
Taken together, these two provisions provide religious employers the
freedom to make hiring and firing decisions that take into account
an individual’s religious background and beliefs.
B. The Origins of ENDA and Its Religious Exemption
1.

Overview and legislative history
ENDA, if passed, would prohibit employment discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity.50 It would allow
employees to sue their employers for discriminatory treatment in
hiring, firing, promotion, or other terms and conditions of
employment.51 Such discrimination could include, for example,
refusing to hire an employee who is openly gay, terminating an
employee who expresses his intent to undergo a gender transition, or
failing to promote an LGBT employee to a management position
where she would have greater public visibility. Like Title VII, ENDA
would apply only to employers with fifteen or more employees and
would generally not apply to volunteers who receive no
compensation.52 The bill’s stated purpose is
47. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(2) (2012).
48. See, e.g., EEOC v. Kamehameha Sch./Bishop Estate, 990 F.2d 458, 464 (9th
Cir. 1993) (interpreting “curriculum” narrowly to mean “coursework and required
school activities”). Compare Myers v. Chestnut Hill Coll., No. 95-6244, 1996 WL
67612, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 13, 1996) (holding that a private Catholic college passed
the “control” test because the church maintained its operations), with Siegel v. Truett
McConnell Coll., Inc., 13 F. Supp. 2d 1335, 1340 (N.D. Ga. 1994) (requiring an
organization to have “extremely close ties” to organized religion to be considered
under church control and thereby exempt from the requirements of Title VII), aff’d
sub nom. 73 F.3d 1108 (11th Cir. 1995).
49. See Aden & Carlson-Thies, supra note 6, at 5 (speculating that the “paucity of
case law” surrounding Title VII’s second religious exemption is related to the fact
that many consider it redundant).
50. S. 815, 113th Cong. § 4(a) (2013).
51. FAMILY EQUALITY COUNCIL, THE EMPLOYMENT NON-DISCRIMINATION ACT: FACT
SHEET 1 (2013), available at http://www.familyequality.org/_asset/xh3z4t/ENDAFact-Sheet-6.7.13.pdf.
52. S. 815 § 3(a)(1)(5).
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to address the history and persistent, widespread pattern of discrimination on the bases of sexual orientation and gender identity
by private sector employers and local, State, and Federal Government employers . . . [and] to reinforce the Nation’s commitment to
fairness and equal opportunity in the workplace consistent with the
fundamental right of religious freedom.53

Over the years, Congress has come close to passing several versions
of ENDA, and the bill has undergone numerous changes designed to
facilitate its passage. U.S. Representative Bella Abzug sponsored the
first gay employee rights bill in collaboration with the National Gay
and Lesbian Task Force during the 1970s. In 1994, supporters of this
bill reframed it as ENDA and offered it as an alternative to the gay
civil rights omnibus bill under consideration in the House at that
time.54 ENDA narrowed the scope of Abzug’s bill by limiting
protection to the employment context.55 Although transgender
advocates began lobbying gay and lesbian leaders to amend ENDA in
the mid-1990’s,56 Congress did not introduce a trans-inclusive version
of the bill until 2007.57 This bill was short-lived, as the House decided
instead to consider a version limited to sexual orientation, which later
passed in the House only.58 However, in 2009, trans-inclusive bills
were introduced in both the House and Senate.59 Though some
LGBT rights advocates have argued that a trans-inclusive ENDA is too
extreme for many Americans and is the reason the bill has not yet
become law, a consensus has developed among advocates that ENDA
must include protection for LGBT employees.60
Thus, the
transgender provision remains an important part of the current bill.61
53. Id. § 2(1), (4) (emphasis added).
54. Task Force History, NAT’L GAY & LESBIAN TASK FORCE, http://www.thetaskforce.org
/about_us/history (last visited Aug. 14, 2014).
55. Jerome Hunt, A History of the Employment Non-Discrimination Act: It’s Past Time
to Pass This Law, CENTER FOR AM. PROGRESS (July 19, 2011), http://www.
americanprogress.org/issues/lgbt/news/2011/07/19/10006/a-history-of-theemployment-non-discrimination-act.
56. Task Force History, supra note 54.
57. Id.; H.R. 3686, 110th Cong. § 3(a)(1) (2007) (forbidding employers from
refusing to hire or discharging any individual due to the “individual’s actual or
perceived gender identity”); id. § 2(a)(6) (defining “gender identity” as “genderrelated identity, appearance, or mannerisms or other gender-related characteristics
of an individual, with or without regard to the individual’s designated sex at birth”).
58. H.R. 3685, 110th Cong. § 4(a)(1) (2007) (prohibiting employers from
making hiring and firing decisions based on actual or perceived sexual orientation
but declining to address gender identity); Task Force History, supra note 54.
59. Task Force History, supra note 54.
60. Hunt, supra note 55.
61. See, e.g., Katrina C. Rose, Where the Rubber Left the Road: The Use and Misuse of
History in the Quest for the Federal Employment Non-Discrimination Act, 18 TEMP. POL. &
CIV. RTS. L. REV. 397, 397 (2009) (describing how, when U.S. Representative Barney
Frank dropped protection for transgendered employees from the 2007 bill, many gay
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On July 10, 2013, the Senate Health, Education, Labor & Pensions
Committee approved ENDA by a 15–7 vote.62 When the bill came
before the Senate, Pennsylvania Republican Pat Toomey proposed an
amendment that would have expanded the religious exemption to
religiously affiliated employers taking part in primarily secular
activities.63
After rejecting this amendment and accepting by
unanimous vote an amendment preventing government retaliation
against religious organizations, the Senate approved ENDA on
November 7, 2013.64
2.

ENDA’s religious exemption
Much like the rest of the bill, ENDA’s religious exemption has
undergone a number of modifications over the years.65 In the 110th
Congress, Representative Barney Frank introduced H.R. 2015, which
included a narrower exemption stating that ENDA “shall not apply to
any of the employment practices of a religious corporation,
association, educational institution, or society which has as its primary
purpose religious ritual or worship or the teaching or spreading of
religious doctrine or belief.”66 When this bill died in committee,
Frank introduced H.R. 3685, which defined a religious organization
more narrowly as:
(A) a religious corporation, association, or society; or
(B) a school, college, university, or other educational institution or
institution of learning, if—
rights activists and national and local gay rights groups “demanded that gender
identity be put back in the bill, guaranteeing its defeat for years to come”); John
Aravosis, How Did the T Get in LGBT?, SALON (Oct. 8, 2007, 7:10 AM), http://www.
salon.com/2007/10/08/lgbt (acknowledging that civil rights legislation, like other
types of legislation, is a series of compromises, and advocating for the passage of a
non-trans-inclusive ENDA on these grounds).
62. Lisa Milam-Perez & Pamela Wolf, ENDA Passes in Senate; Faces Tough Hurdle in
House—Pending Legislation, HUM. RESOURCES MGMT. COMPENSATION GUIDE (CCH)
2013, ¶ 32,682 (2013), available at 2013 WL 5963567; Chris Johnson, HISTORIC:
Senate Panel Advances Trans-Inclusive ENDA, WASH. BLADE (July 10, 2013), http://www.
washingtonblade.com/2013/07/10/historic-senate-panel-advances-trans-inclusive-enda.
63. See Sunnivie Brydum, In Historic First, Senate Approves ENDA, ADVOCATE.COM
(Nov. 7, 2013, 1:53 PM), http://www.advocate.com/politics/2013/11/07/breakingsenate-approves-enda-initial-vote (quoting Senator Toomey, who said that “the
agreement is that religious institutions, including those engaging in some secular
activities, should be exempt from engaging in activities that contradict their religious
beliefs”); see also infra Part I.B.2 (describing the religious exemptions in various
versions of ENDA).
64. Brydum, supra note 63.
65. Some of the early versions of the bill include: S. 1705, 108th Cong.
§§ 3(a)(8), 9 (introduced Oct. 2, 2003); H.R. 2692, 107th Cong. §§ 3(a)(8), 9
(introduced July 31, 2001); S. 869, 105th Cong. §§ 3(a)(8), 9(a) (introduced June 10,
1997); H.R. 4636, 103d Cong. §§ 6(a)–(b), 17(9)(A)–(B) (introduced June 23, 1994).
66. H.R. 2015, 110th Cong. § 6(a) (2007).
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(i) the institution is in whole or substantial part controlled,
managed, owned, or supported by a particular religion, religious
corporation, association, or society; or
(ii) the curriculum of the institution is directed toward the
propagation of a particular religion.67

Although the bill’s supporters maintained that the above definition
of a religious organization was synonymous with that of Title VII,
opponents argued that courts could interpret the language to exempt
a smaller range of organizations than are exempt under Title VII.68
Among the amendments offered in response to these concerns was
one that would have significantly expanded the scope of the religious
exemption to include organizations that “maintain a faith-based
mission.”69 The House Labor and Education Committee rejected this
amendment on the grounds that it was overbroad, given that the bill
already “adopt[ed] Title VII’s definition of a religious organization
and thereby import[ed] long-standing existing law on who is or is not
a religious organization.”70
However, some members of the religious community continued to
oppose the definition of a “religious organization” by maintaining
that the exemption would unfairly relieve seminaries and religious
colleges from their obligations under ENDA while failing to exempt
non-denominational faith-based colleges.71
In response,
Congressman George Miller, co-sponsor of the bill, introduced an
amendment that incorporated the language of Title VII’s religious
exemption: “This Act shall not apply to a corporation, association,
educational institution, or society that is exempt from the religious
discrimination provisions of title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
pursuant to section 702(a) or 703(e)(2) of such Act (42 U.S.C. 2000e1(a); 2000e-2(e)(2)).”72 Congressman Miller’s amendment passed,
and this language appears in the current version of ENDA recently
passed by the Senate.73 Congress has not attempted to clarify this
67. H.R. 3685, 110th Cong. § 3(a)(8) (2007).
68. H.R. REP. NO. 110-406, pt. 1, at 49 (2007) (noting that although the authors
of H.R. 2015 intended to exempt a broader range of religious institutions than
Title VII, the language of H.R. 2015’s religious exemption is “more prescriptive”
than that of earlier versions).
69. Id. at 10.
70. Id.
71. See Aden & Carlson-Thies, supra note 6, at 5 (describing the U.S. House of
Representatives debate over the religious exemption of H.R. 3685 and the concern
that it would exempt church-controlled colleges and universities based on
denominational control but would not exempt a non-denominational Christian
college such as Wheaton College in Illinois).
72. H.R. REP. NO. 110-422, at 3 (2007).
73. S. 815, 113th Cong. § 6(a) (2013).
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language or to distinguish ENDA’s religious exemption from that of Title
VII.74 Thus, should ENDA become law, its religious exemption will likely
apply at a minimum to those organizations covered by Title VII, including
religious corporations and faith-based educational institutions.75
Presently, ENDA’s fate remains uncertain due to partisan politics.
The bill is stalled in the House of Representatives, and House
Speaker John Boehner has stated that he will continue to block it
from coming to vote.76 While House Democrats could theoretically
use a discharge petition to bypass Republican leadership, such a
maneuver is used only rarely.77 Despite the existing political
obstacles, ENDA enjoys broad support in the House: it currently has
202 co-sponsors, six of whom are Republican.78 While the current
Congress is unlikely to pass ENDA, recent support for and momentum
behind the bill suggest that it may become law in the coming years.79
From its inception to its passage in the Senate, ENDA’s religious
exemption has been a key component of the bill and has been crucial
in garnering support from religious organizations.80 While it is clear
that an exemption is politically necessary, it is less clear how courts
74. See id. (providing no additional guidance on exemptions for religious
organizations under ENDA).
75. See infra notes 88–101 and accompanying text (discussing the likelihood that,
in the case of ENDA, courts will find that the term “religious employer” covers places
of worship, religiously affiliated non-profits, and religious educational institutions,
and entertaining the possibility that courts will interpret the phrase even more
broadly in light of policy concerns underlying ENDA).
76. Amanda Terkel, Harry Reid Predicts House Passage of ENDA If John Boehner Stops
Blocking It, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 5, 2013, 3:58 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com
/2013/11/05/house-enda_n_4218700.html (noting that Speaker Boehner believes
the bill will lead to an increase in frivolous litigation and negatively affect small business).
77. A discharge petition is a legislative maneuver that would require the minority
party to obtain 218 signatures to override the Speaker’s decision and force a floor
vote. See Justin Snow, Amid House Intransigence, Democrats Could Attempt to Force ENDA
Vote, METRO WKLY. (Mar. 26, 2014), http://www.metroweekly.com/poliglot/2014/03
/amid-house-intransigence-democrats-could-attempt-t.html.
78. Id.; see also Terkel, supra note 76 (“If [ENDA] came up for a vote in the
House, it would pass.” (quoting Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid)).
79. See Haberman, supra note 4 (citing a 2013 studying finding that 68% of voters
support the passage of federal legislation prohibiting discrimination based on sexual
orientation or gender identity). Furthermore, most large businesses have already
shown their support for ENDA’s policy goals by putting in place their own
discrimination policies: 88% of Fortune 500 companies have sexual orientation nondiscrimination policies, while 57% have gender identity non-discrimination policies.
Dan Rafter, Nation’s Leading Businesses Support Employment Non-Discrimination Act as
Senate Hearing Nears, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN (July 9, 2013), http://www.hrc.org/blog/entry
/nations-leading-businesses-support-employment-non-discrimination-act-as-sen.
80. See, e.g., Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2009: Hearing on H.R. 3017 Before
the H. Comm. on Educ. & Labor, 111th Cong. 57–58 (2009) (statement of Rabbi David
Saperstein, Director and Counsel, Religious Action Center of Reform Judaism)
(testifying that ENDA’s “exemption for religious organizations[] is an essential part
of the legislation” because it “protect[s] the freedom of religious organizations with
differing beliefs to practice their faith as they see fit”).
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will interpret the exemption as written and whether ENDA will be
effective in ensuring that LGBT employees are protected from
discrimination in the workplace.
II. ENDA’S RELIGIOUS EXEMPTION SHOULD ALLOW
DISCRIMINATION ONLY IN CASES WHERE AN EMPLOYER’S FIRST
AMENDMENT RIGHTS ARE IMPLICATED
Among ENDA’s stated purposes is this objective: “[T]o reinforce
the Nation’s commitment to fairness and equal opportunity in the
workplace consistent with the fundamental right of religious
freedom.”81 However, ENDA’s religious exemption provides employers
with protections that extend beyond what is required by the First
Amendment. The exemption applies to all organizations that are
exempt from the religious discrimination provisions of Title VII
regardless of whether the discrimination in question bears any
relation to the organization’s religious mission or beliefs.82 Thus, as
written, ENDA’s religious exemption is overly broad because it allows
employers to discriminate even in cases where employing LGBT
individuals poses no conflict with the employer’s religious views.83 As
a result, the exemption undermines the purpose of the law by
eliminating coverage for a large group of employees.
A. ENDA’s Religious Exemption Is Overbroad Because It Allows
Discrimination Irrespective of an Employer’s Religious Beliefs or Its Employee’s
Role in Conveying Those Beliefs
ENDA’s religious exemption is significantly broader than that of
Title VII because it allows a religious employer to discriminate against
an LGBT employee without requiring the employer to show that the

81. S. 815, 113th Cong. § 2(4) (2013). This stated purpose, coupled with
ENDA’s extensive religious exemption, suggests that ENDA’s drafters intended to
afford religious organizations special discretion in the case of discrimination against
LGBT individuals as compared with discrimination against women, minorities, and
other protected groups. See J. Banning Jasiunas, Note, Is ENDA the Answer? Can A
“Separate but Equal” Federal Statute Adequately Protect Gays and Lesbians from Employment
Discrimination?, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1529, 1553–54 (2000) (suggesting that ENDA’s broad
religious exemption “sends a mixed message” because it claims to stamp out sexual
orientation discrimination but excludes a large class of employers from its requirements).
82. Jasiunas, supra note 81, at 1153; see JODY FEDER & CYNTHIA BROUGHER, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., R40934, SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND GENDER IDENTITY DISCRIMINATION
IN EMPLOYMENT: A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE EMPLOYMENT NON-DISCRIMINATION ACT
(ENDA) 7 (2013) (arguing that ENDA’s religious exemption broadens religious
organizations’ ability to discriminate in hiring beyond that provided by Title VII).
83. See infra notes 87–92 and accompanying text (describing two scenarios in which
the religious exemption applies to bar discrimination suits by employees who perform
primarily secular job duties and play no role in preaching the message of the church).
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discrimination is grounded in a religious objection.84 The exemption
therefore provides employers with protections beyond those that are
necessary to safeguard their First Amendment rights. The exemption
does not require discrimination to be consistent with the religious
tenets of an organization, nor does it limit discrimination to employees
holding religious leadership roles in the organization.85 Instead, it
allows discrimination against LGBT employees irrespective of any
religious objection or conflict with homosexuality or transgenderism.86
Congress’s failure to include any limitations on ENDA’s religious
exemption will result in a gap in protection for LGBT employees that
will manifest in two likely scenarios. First, ENDA allows religious
employers to discriminate against LGBT employees even in cases
where the employer has no religious objection to homosexuality or
transgenderism. By including a blanket exemption for religious
corporations, ENDA leaves the door open for supervisors with
personal biases against LGBT employees to make discriminatory
employment decisions based on their own views rather than the
tenets of the religion with which their employer is associated.
Consider, for example, an applicant to a position at a religiously
affiliated community center that has no stated objection to
homosexuality. If a hiring manager, without the knowledge or
consent of the organization’s administration, were to refuse to hire
the hypothetical applicant on the basis of sexual orientation, the
employee would have no grounds for an employment discrimination
suit because the community center would be exempt from coverage
under ENDA. Both the organization and the hiring manager would
escape liability for discrimination even though the discrimination in
question was completely unrelated to the organization’s religious
mission and teachings. Although this scenario may prove to be rare,
discrimination based on personal bias is nonetheless an unintended
consequence of ENDA’s religious exemption and could easily occur
should ENDA pass in its current form.
84. In contrast, in order to receive protection under Title VII’s religious
exemption, an employer must show that the objection is based specifically on a
religious objection to homosexuality and does not implicate another protected
category. FEDER & BROUGHER, supra note 82, at 7.
85. Supra notes 71–75 and accompanying text (noting the open-endedness of
ENDA’s religious exemption, which adopts Title VII’s religious exemption in full but
does not supplement it with clarifying language).
86. See FEDER & BROUGHER, supra note 82, at 7 (observing that ENDA’s religious
exemption “does not appear to limit the permissibility of religious organizations’
discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity to instances in which
those factors may conflict with religious beliefs” and concluding that the exemption
would therefore permit an organization to refuse to hire a gay applicant even if its
religious teachings did not oppose homosexuality).
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ENDA’s religious exemption also fails to distinguish between those
employees who serve as religious leaders and those who engage in
secular work or serve in non-leadership roles. It allows employers to
discriminate against employees without regard to whether those
employees have any role in conveying the religious organization’s
message or promoting its views, including workers who have little or
no contact with congregants or members of the public.87 Take, for
example, a line cook in the cafeteria of a religious school who spends
workdays in the school’s kitchen and interacts very little with students
and visitors to the school. Because the work takes place behind
closed doors, this employee does not play a role in conveying the
organization’s message. Yet, as currently written, ENDA’s religious
exemption would allow school officials to fire or choose not to hire
this individual based on his or her sexual orientation or gender identity.
The exemption’s over-inclusiveness is not limited to employees
who work behind the scenes. While certain employees of religious
organizations, such as receptionists and secular teachers, do have
significant contact with church members and members of the public,
they do not necessarily have any role in representing the religious
organizations themselves. Because these employees’ work-related
duties primarily benefit the religious organizations’ secular activities
rather than their religious missions, the organizations would have a
difficult time demonstrating that ENDA’s protections infringe upon
their First Amendment rights.88 Consider, for instance, a salesperson
for a church-operated commercial enterprise who has substantial
contact with the public on a daily basis. Although this employee’s
clients may not be aware that the employee works for a religious
institution because his or her work is primarily commercial in nature,
the institution would probably still be exempt from ENDA’s
provisions because it would likely qualify as a religious corporation.89
This example further illustrates that ENDA’s religious exemption is
overbroad in that it allows discrimination beyond that which is necessary
to guarantee employers the freedom to exercise their religious beliefs.
Given the case law pertaining to Title VII’s religious exemption, it
is unlikely that courts will effectively address these gaps in protection
87. Jasiunas, supra note 81, at 1553 (observing that ENDA does not require that a
particular sexual orientation or gender identity be a “bona fide occupational
qualification” for a job in order to allow a religious employer to discriminate).
88. See Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 305–06 (1985)
(distinguishing between a church’s evangelical and secular commercial activities).
89. See supra text accompanying notes 86–87 (explaining that no religiouslygrounded objection is required for a religious corporation to discriminate against
an LGBT employee).
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for LGBT employees. The question of whether an employer is a
“religious corporation” under the statute is always the threshold
question for a court’s consideration when reviewing an allegation of
employment discrimination.90 Once an organization demonstrates
that it qualifies as a “religious corporation” under Title VII, the
organization is exempt from the Act’s requirements concerning
hiring and firing and is given broad discretion in making religiouslygrounded employment decisions.91 This safeguard, according to the
Supreme Court, ensures that the organization has the freedom to
exercise its religion without government interference.92
Courts are likely to find that ENDA exempts organizations that
would qualify as religious corporations under Title VII. Given that
ENDA adopts Title VII’s definition of a “religious corporation” in its
entirety, it is possible, but highly doubtful, that courts will interpret
ENDA’s exemption more narrowly than that of Title VII.93 Thus, at a
minimum, courts will likely exempt places of worship, religiously
affiliated non-profits, and religious educational institutions from
ENDA’s requirements without regard for whether a particular
instance of discrimination is necessary to protect an employer’s First
90. See supra note 42 (listing cases in which the primary question for the court
was whether the employer in question qualified as a religious corporation).
91. Supra note 46 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Corp. of the Presiding
Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 330–
31, 337 (1987) (allowing, for the first time, a not-for-profit facility of the Mormon
Church to discharge an employee for not being a member of the church); Zoë
Robinson, Rationalizing Religious Exemptions: A Legislative Process Theory of Statutory
Exemptions for Religion, 20 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 133, 161–62 (2011) (suggesting
that the Amos court accepted as legitimate “Congress’s decision to accord religion a
broad exemption from laws of general application”). But see Spencer v. World
Vision, Inc., 633 F.3d 723, 735, 737–41 (9th Cir. 2011) (O’Scannlain, J., concurring)
(proposing three new tests for determining whether an entity qualifies as a religious
organization under Title VII, including status as a not-for-profit entity, selfidentification as being organized for a religious purpose, and the organization’s
engagement in activity “consistent with[] and in furtherance of[] [its] religious
purposes”); id. at 741–42, 748 (Kleinfeld, J., concurring) (rephrasing Judge
O’Scannlain’s test); Roger W. Dyer, Jr., Note, Qualifying for the Title VII Religious
Organization Exemption: Federal Circuits Split over Proper Test, 76 MO. L. REV. 545, 547,
554–59, 567 (2011) (describing the various tests historically used by courts to
determine whether an employer may be considered religious and arguing that Spencer
created greater uncertainty for organizations that seek to invoke the religious exemption).
92. See, e.g., Amos, 483 U.S. at 339 (asserting that Title VII’s religious exemption
“effectuates a more complete separation” of church and state and prevents
unnecessary judicial inquiry into religious belief). But see Robinson, supra note 91, at
161 (arguing that Title VII’s religious exemption is a “solid example of Congress
providing for religious free exercise beyond what is constitutionally required”).
93. In fact, it would be within the courts’ discretion to interpret the definition
of a “religious corporation” more broadly in the context of ENDA. See infra notes
95–96 and accompanying text (discussing the possibility that courts interpreting
ENDA may not recognize those legal theories that have developed under Title VII
and instead favor an interpretation of “religious corporation” that goes beyond the
limits of Title VII’s definition).
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Amendment Rights.94 In light of these gaps in coverage, it is
inevitable that LGBT employees will continue to face discrimination
at the hands of some religious employers.
Courts may find that a larger category of organizations satisfies the
definition of “religious organization” and is thereby exempt from
ENDA’s requirements.
Because ENDA exists as stand-alone
legislation separate from the Civil Rights Act, courts would be within
their discretion to find that the policy concerns underlying ENDA are
sufficiently distinct from those underlying Title VII to permit a
broader interpretation of the definition of a “religious corporation”
under ENDA.95 Indeed, courts could theoretically expand this
definition to include even those employers that are unable to
demonstrate a connection between the owners’ religious beliefs and
the organization’s purpose or identity, such as a retail store that is not
affiliated with a church or religious institution but whose owners have
strongly held religious beliefs regarding homosexuality.96 The fact
that courts do not uniformly recognize sexual orientation as a suspect
class for the purposes of judicial scrutiny suggests that courts
interpreting ENDA may take a less restrictive approach in defining
the phrase “religious corporation.”97 Absent any guidance in the text
of the Act, it is difficult to predict precisely how courts will resolve this
94. See supra notes 42–45 and accompanying text (discussing the court’s broad
interpretation of the term “religious corporation” in the Title VII context).
95. See FEDER & BROUGHER, supra note 82, at 9 (suggesting that courts may
conclude from the fact that ENDA was introduced as stand-alone legislation rather
than as an amendment to Title VII that the two laws implicate different policy
considerations); cf. Jasiunas, supra note 81, at 1554–56 (noting that while the American
Discrimination in Employment Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act are both
based on the same framework as Title VII courts have read these statutes very differently).
96. See Jasiunas, supra note 81, at 1556 (providing an example of “a hypothetical
employer whose customers are predominantly religious organizations” and suggesting
that courts would be hesitant to find that this employer is subject to ENDA’s requirements).
97. The Supreme Court has declined to identify a level of scrutiny to be used in
cases of sexual orientation and gender identity discrimination. See United States v.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693, 2695–96 (2013) (finding it unnecessary to use
heightened scrutiny to hold the Defense of Marriage Act, a law restricting the federal
interpretation of “marriage” and “spouse” to apply only to heterosexual unions,
unconstitutional under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses); Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 593–94 (2003) (holding that there is only a protected liberty
interest in same-sex sexual activity, not a fundamental right to same-sex activity, and
that the government needs a legitimate state interest to justify an intrusion into that
right). While the majority of lower courts continue to evaluate claims of sexual
orientation discrimination using only rational basis review, a number of courts have
used strict or intermediate scrutiny in such cases. See Witt v. Dep’t of the Air Force,
527 F.3d 806, 819 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that “when the government attempts to
intrude upon the personal and private lives of homosexuals . . . the government must
advance an important governmental interest, the intrusion must significantly further
that interest, and the intrusion must be necessary to further that interest”); Varnum
v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 895–96 (Iowa 2009) (finding that homosexuals are a quasi-suspect
class and that laws concerning them are therefore subject to heightened scrutiny).
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issue, but it is certainly within the realm of possibility that courts will
interpret the term “religious organization” more broadly than they
have in the context of Title VII.98
Further complicating the matter is the Supreme Court’s 2014
decision in Hobby Lobby, where the Court held that the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA)99 protects a closely held
corporation’s right to deny its employees a federal entitlement to
health coverage for contraceptives based on the religious objections
of the corporation’s owners.100 RFRA, the basis of the decision,
provides that the government “shall not substantially burden a
person’s exercise of religion” unless that burden “is the least
restrictive means of furthering [a] compelling governmental
interest.”101 The majority in Hobby Lobby held that the company was
exempt from the contraception coverage provision because the
provision required the company’s owners to “engage in conduct that
seriously violat[ed] their religious beliefs.”102 The Court asserted that
it is not within the discretion of the federal courts to consider
whether a religious belief asserted in a RFRA case is reasonable;
instead, the inquiry is limited to whether the belief is “sincerely
held.”103 The Court’s determination was therefore based not on
whether the contraception coverage provision imposed a substantial
burden on the organization, but whether the company’s objection to
the coverage was based on a sincerely held religious belief.104
Although the Court addressed “the possibility that discrimination in
hiring, for example on the basis of race, might be cloaked as religious
practice to escape legal sanction,” it did not directly reference ENDA
or discuss how the decision would affect cases of discrimination
against LGBT employees.105 Justice Ginsburg’s dissent lamented the
“startling breadth” of the decision, suggesting that it would allow any
corporation to obtain a RFRA exemption simply by showing that the
law in question was in conflict with its religious beliefs.106
98. See FEDER & BROUGHER, supra, note 82, at 9 (asserting that without express
statutory clarification, judicial elaboration will be needed to clarify the scope of the
definition of “religious organization” as it relates to ENDA).
99. Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000bb (2012)).
100. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., No. 13-354, slip op. at 1–2 (U.S. June 30, 2014).
101. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a)(b).
102. Hobby Lobby, No. 13-354, at 32.
103. Id. at 35.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 46.
106. Id. at 29 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (“Suppose an employer’s sincerely held
religious belief is offended by health coverage of vaccines, or paying the minimum
wage . . . or according women equal pay for substantially similar work . . . ?”).
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If the dissent’s fears are realized, Hobby Lobby could give courts the
green light to extend RFRA’s protections to corporations posing
religious objections to discrimination laws such as ENDA—regardless of
any religious exemptions that might be included in those laws.107
Because the Court has already found that RFRA applies to closely
held corporations, these corporations could be exempt from ENDA’s
requirements even though they are not explicitly included in its
religious exemption. Thus, even a narrower religious exemption will
not guarantee protection for any LGBT employees in the event of a
RFRA challenge. However, this does not render ENDA’s religious
exemption any less crucial. In cases where RFRA does not bar the
application of ENDA, a narrower religious exemption will ensure that
courts have less leeway to expand the definition of a religious
corporation.108 Furthermore, a narrower exemption will reaffirm
Congress’s commitment to protecting individual rights in a postHobby Lobby world.
Thus, a number of factors will influence the courts’ interpretation
of ENDA and its religious exemption. Recent cases complicate this
picture even further. Without additional clarification by Congress,
ENDA’s religious exemption is bound to lead to disagreement among
the courts and confusion for plaintiffs attempting to bring
discrimination claims.109 Part B of this Note will argue that by
narrowing ENDA’s religious exemption, Congress could ensure a
more predictable judicial response while upholding the purpose of
the bill more fully.

107. During oral arguments, Justice Kagan predicted that if employers’ free
exercise claims were given deference, “you would see religious objectors come out of
the woodwork with respect to all of these laws,” and referred to the “parade of
horribles” that could result, including objections to anti-discrimination laws, Social
Security contributions, or minimum wage requirements. Transcript of Oral
Argument at 14:3–9, 16:5–19, Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., No. 13-354
(U.S. Mar. 25, 2014). See generally Ruth Marcus, Ruth Marcus: Supreme Court Hobby
Lobby Ruling Could Start a “Parade of Horribles,” WASH. POST (Mar. 25, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/ruth-marcus-supreme-court-hobby-lobbyruling-could-start-a-parade-of-horribles/2014/03/25/e803675a-b45e-11e3-8cb6284052554d74_story.html (discussing the issues and competing interests at stake in
claims brought under RFRA).
108. In recognition of the need to expand ENDA’s protections for employees of
religious organizations, a number of major LGBT rights groups have withdrawn their
support for the bill following the Hobby Lobby decision on the grounds that its
religious exemption is overbroad. See Ed O’Keefe, Gay Rights Groups Withdraw
Support of ENDA After Hobby Lobby Decision, WASH. POST (July 8, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2014/07/08/gay-rightsgroup-withdrawing-support-of-enda-after-hobby-lobby-decision.
109. See, e.g., Jasiunas, supra note 81, at 1554–56 (discussing how a law’s standalone status affects how courts interpret its provisions).
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B. Congress Should Amend ENDA’s Religious Exemption to Allow Employers
to Discriminate Only in Cases Where Employees Would Be Exempt From
Coverage Under the Ministerial Exception
While it remains to be seen how courts will interpret ENDA’s
religious exemption, one thing is certain: LGBT employees will
continue to be subject to discrimination by religious employers under
the exemption as written. Should ENDA become law, the only way to
guarantee LGBT employees complete protection from discrimination
will be to remove ENDA’s religious exemption entirely. Removing
the exemption would represent a significant step toward equality for
LGBT people in the workplace and would pose little threat to
employers’ First Amendment rights. Sexual orientation and gender
identity, like race and sex, are immutable characteristics that do not
reflect a person’s character and do not necessarily bear any relation
to his or her religious beliefs.110 Thus, just as Title VII prohibits
religious employers from discriminating against individuals on the
basis of race, sex, and national origin while respecting those
employers’ First Amendment rights, ENDA can and should protect
LGBT employees from such discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation and gender identity in the same manner. Failure to
provide these safeguards affirms that protecting employees from
discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity is
somehow less important than protecting employees from discrimination
on the basis of other immutable characteristics such as race and sex.
However, removing the religious exemption from the bill is almost
certainly a political impossibility. Much of the bill’s support has been
contingent on the inclusion of a broad religious exemption, and
removing it entirely could prompt even the staunchest backers to
withdraw their support.111 Therefore, in the interest of ensuring
ENDA’s passage, it will be necessary to consider other options for
extending coverage to a larger number of employees.
Assuming some exemption should be granted to religious
employers, it should be kept as narrow as possible to protect the
rights of LGBT employees. The drafters of ENDA modeled the bill
closely after Title VII, and this decision suggests that it would be
110. See Kari Balog, Note, Equal Protection for Homosexuals: Why the Immutability
Argument Is Necessary and How It Is Met, 53 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 545, 571 (2006) (arguing
that sexual orientation is “a trait as immutable as race or gender” and basing this
argument on a broad consensus of scientific research).
111. See supra Part I.B.2 (describing in depth the key role the religious exemption
has played in garnering support for ENDA); see also Aden & Carlson-Thies, supra note 6,
at 4 (noting that ENDA draft bills have routinely included an exemption for religious
organizations to protect the rights of these organizations to express their religious views).

DABROWSKI.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

11/7/2014 12:38 PM

THE EXCEPTION THAT DOESN’T PROVE THE RULE

1979

appropriate to craft a religious exemption for ENDA that is consistent
with that of Title VII rather than one that merely adopts Title VII’s
language.112 If Congress chooses to include a religious exemption in
ENDA, it should enact a narrow exemption that allows religious
employers to discriminate against LGBT employees only in cases
where the ministerial exception would apply in the Title VII context.
Congress could accomplish this change in a number of ways. The
House could introduce an amendment, either prior to passage of the
bill or following its passage. Alternatively, Congress could wait for the
courts to interpret the bill once it has been signed into law and
respond with an amendment nullifying any negative precedent, as it
did in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Wards Cove
Packing Co. v. Atonio.113 In other words, if Congress disagrees with the
result of the courts’ interpretation of ENDA, it could expand the
religious exemption retroactively. In either case, Congress should
amend ENDA to state that, applying the Supreme Court’s language
in Hosanna-Tabor, any employee with “a role in conveying the
Church’s message and carrying out its mission” will be exempt from
ENDA’s coverage.114 This approach will provide an acceptable

112. See FEDER & BROUGHER, supra note 82, at 1 (describing ENDA as “[p]atterned
on” Title VII and noting that ENDA, like Title VII, will be enforced by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission). As discussed, although ENDA adopts in full
the language of Title VII’s religious exemption, the result is an exemption that
applies to a much broader category of employees. See supra Part II.A (explaining why
ENDA’s religious exemption is effectively much broader than that in Title VII despite
using the same language).
113. 490 U.S. 642, 650–51, 659, 661 (1989) (holding that, in determining the
legitimacy of a disparate impact claim, “the proper comparison [is] between the
racial composition of [the at-issue jobs] and the racial composition of the
qualified . . . population . . . in the relevant labor market,” a decision that made it
more difficult for plaintiffs to bring disparate impact claims (alterations in original)
(internal quotations omitted)), superseded by statute on other grounds, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(k) (2012), as recognized in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
Congress responded with the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which expanded the scope of
the legal protections for employees and essentially nullified the Wards Cove decision.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2; see Michael J. Songer, Note, Decline of Title VII Disparate Impact:
The Role of the 1991 Civil Rights Act and the Ideologies of Federal Judges, 11 MICH. J. RACE &
L. 247, 253 (2005) (explaining how the Civil Rights Act of 1991 reversed parts of the
Supreme Court’s narrow interpretation of disparate impact claims by making an
exception to the Wards Cove analysis “for criteria that are not capable of separation
for analysis” (internal quotation marks omitted)). A similar approach could be
useful in the case of ENDA because it would allow the courts to weigh in on the law
prior to Congress amending it. In addition, opponents of the amendment might be
more inclined to support it after observing the negative effects of an expansive
judicial interpretation of the religious exemption.
114. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. E.E.O.C., 132 S. Ct.
694, 708 (2012) (holding that because the plaintiff’s job duties consisted of
“transmitting the Lutheran faith to the next generation,” she was covered by the
ministerial exemption).
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balance between protecting employers’ religious freedom and
employees’ individual rights.
Adopting the ministerial exception will give religious employers
the ability to select clergy free from government interference while
providing LGBT employees the same level of protection as employees
who experience discrimination on the basis of race, sex, and national
origin. Although this exemption is significantly narrower than
ENDA’s current language, it adequately exempts all of those
employees who have a role in preaching the message and teachings
of a religious organization and whose protection under ENDA would
therefore implicate First Amendment rights. In addition to covering
all of those employees commonly thought of as ministers, the
ministerial exemption has generally been held to cover teachers at
religious schools, choir directors, and other employees whose jobs
require them to openly express the organization’s message.115 The
formal job title itself is not decisive, and courts analyzing claims
under the ministerial exemption also consider the practical role of
the employee and the extent to which an employee holds herself out
as a religious representative of the church.116 An employee may be
considered a minister within the meaning of the ministerial
exemption even if her job duties are primarily secular.117 Therefore,
this exemption sufficiently protects the free exercise rights of
religious employers because it allows those employers to be selective
in choosing religious leaders while at the same time providing full
protection for those employees who do not serve in leadership roles.
Beyond political necessity, there are a number of benefits to
narrowing ENDA’s religious exemption rather than removing it from
the bill entirely. Giving religious employers the ability to discriminate
115. See, e.g., Cannata v. Catholic Diocese of Austin, 700 F.3d 169, 177–78 (5th Cir.
2012) (exempting from the requirements of the ADA and the ADEA a music director
and pianist who made “unilateral, important decisions regarding the musical
direction at Mass”); Dayner v. Archdiocese of Hartford, 23 A.3d 1192, 1195, 1201
(Conn. 2011) (holding that the ministerial exception barred a former school
principal’s tort and contract law claims); Temple Emanuel of Newton v. Mass.
Comm’n Against Discrimination, 975 N.E.2d. 433, 434 (Mass. 2012) (concluding that
a teacher at a Jewish Sunday school was covered by the ministerial exception and
thereby exempt from bringing a claim of age discrimination). But see Archdiocese of
Wash. v. Moersen, 925 A.2d 659, 660, 665–66 (Md. 2007) (holding that the
ministerial exception did not apply to a church organist who had no discretion in
choosing the music he played, did not lead choirs or teach hymns, and was not
required to have any religious training).
116. See supra notes 18–20 (laying out factors courts have considered in
determining whether an employee falls under the ministerial exception).
117. See Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 708–09 (noting that even the heads of
congregations generally have a mix of secular and religious duties and asserting that
these circumstances do not preclude them from falling under the ministerial exception).
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in the hiring and firing of religious leaders will help ensure that
ENDA is not struck down by the Court for violating religious liberties,
since the exemption would prevent the government from interfering
with an employer’s right to select clergy who represent its faith.118
This approach will also help to shield ENDA from attack under
RFRA. Though such an attack is probable given that the Court found
that RFRA applied in Hobby Lobby, courts will be less likely to find that
ENDA substantially burdens the free exercise of religion if it contains
at least some religious exemption.119 Because the language and
purpose of ENDA so closely mirror those of Title VII, courts are likely
to look to the growing body of case law surrounding Title VII’s
ministerial exception when interpreting a similar exception in ENDA.
Thus, implementation of the proposed religious exemption should
be relatively straightforward, as judicial disagreement will likely be
limited primarily to that which currently exists in the Title VII
ministerial exception context.120 Finally, a narrower exemption will
afford religious employers discretion in hiring and other employment
practices while at the same time giving them an incentive to provide
antidiscrimination training for their workers and to develop clearly
stated policies concerning discrimination against LGBT employees.121
Moreover, as it is currently written, ENDA’s religious exemption
does nothing to serve the needs of the vast majority of religious
employers because these employers have no intention of
discriminating against LGBT employees. A large number of religious
organizations have supported ENDA, both in its current form and in
previous forms.122 Respect for the dignity of all people is the basis for
118. See Aden & Carlson-Thies, supra note 6, at 4 (noting that critics of ENDA have
argued that its protections “inevitably clash with the right to free exercise and
expression of religion, including the right to believe and express that homosexual
conduct is sinful”). See generally Jack M. Battaglia, Religion, Sexual Orientation, and SelfRealization: First Amendment Principles and Anti-Discrimination Laws, 76 U. DET. MERCY
L. REV. 189, 340–47 (1999) (outlining the First Amendment concerns for religious
organizations implicated by anti-discrimination laws).
119. See supra notes 107–08 (discussing possible implications of Hobby Lobby); Corp.
of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483
U.S. 327, 345 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“Such an exemption demarcates a sphere
of deference with respect to those activities most likely to be religious.”).
120. See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 707 (“We are reluctant, however, to
adopt a rigid formula for deciding when an employee qualifies as a minister.”).
121. Cf. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, S. 815: EMPLOYMENT NON-DISCRIMINATION ACT OF
2013 3 (2013), available at http://cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments
/s815.pdf (predicting that the costs associated with modifying emplo yment
procedures in response to ENDA would be limited to updating employment manuals
and building on training procedures already in place).
122. A coalition of religious advocacy organizations has declared their support for
ENDA, stating that they “[could not] tolerate arbitrary discrimination against
millions of Americans just because of who they are.” FCNL and Faith Organizations
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every major religion, and even those religions that are openly
opposed to homosexuality and transgenderism generally do not
condone discrimination based on basic human rights principles.123
Religious employers may well decline to exercise their right to
discriminate against their employees based on these principles, which
would suggest that ENDA’s expansive religious exemption has more
to do with politics than with religious opposition.124 In addition,
irrespective of any religious objections, not all religious organizations
will be willing to outwardly condemn their employees’ behavior.
Religious corporations that are not diametrically opposed to
homosexuality and transgenderism will be unlikely to make a claim of
religious opposition and risk losing the support of their members.125
Thus, only a narrow religious exemption is needed to protect the
rights of LGBT employees from the small number of employers who
would engage in this type of discrimination.
ENDA’s current religious exemption is unprecedented and
excessive, and it illustrates Congress’s willingness to prioritize the
rights of employers over the protection of employees’ individual
liberties. Furthermore, the exemption does not effectively represent
the interests of the majority of religious organizations, most of which
would choose not to discriminate if given the opportunity. An exemption
that mirrors the ministerial exception applied in the Title VII context

Support the Employment Non-Discrimination Act, FRIENDS COMM. ON NAT’L LEGISLATION
(July 15, 2010), http://fcnl.org/issues/discrimination/fcnl_and_faith_organizations
_support_the_employment_nondiscrimination_act.
These groups include the
Alliance of Baptists, the American Jewish Committee, Catholics in Alliance for the
Common Good, Muslims for Progressive Values, the Episcopal Church, the Sikh
Coalition, the United Synagogue of Conservative Judaism, the United Methodist
Church—General Board of Church and Society, and many others. Id.
123. See, e.g., Christopher Kaczor, Seven Principles of Catholic Social Teaching,
CATHOLIC.COM, http://www.catholic.com/magazine/articles/seven-principles-of-catholic
-social-teaching (last visited Aug. 15, 2014) (“The foundation for Catholic social
thought is the proper understanding and value of the human person.”); Seven Themes
of Catholic Social Teaching, U.S. CONF. OF CATH. BISHOPS, http://www.usccb.org
/beliefs-and-teachings/what-we-believe/catholic-social-teaching/seven-themes-ofcatholic-social-teaching.cfm (last visited June 25, 2014) (asserting that the basic rights
of workers must be respected if the dignity of work is to be protected).
124. See, e.g., Laura Meckler, Religious Exemptions at Center of ENDA Debate, WALL ST.
J. (Nov. 1, 2013, 12:29 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2013/11/01/religiousexemptions-at-center-of-enda-debate (discussing the political maneuvering
surrounding the ministerial exemption, including Senator Rand Paul’s suggested
amendment that would exempt any for-profit business that alleged that hiring LGBT
people would “burden the employer’s exercise of religion”).
125. See supra note 122 (listing numerous religious advocacy groups that have
declared their support for ENDA). For example, 74% of Catholic voters are in favor
of workplace protections for gay and transgender employees. Krehely, supra note 1.
Thus, it may be in the interest of Catholic institutions to align themselves with their
own employees by supporting ENDA’s protections.
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represents a better compromise between protecting the First
Amendment rights of employers and the civil rights of LGBT employees.
Although ENDA will provide essential protections to LGBT
employees, there is no evidence that it will significantly increase the
amount of litigation in federal courts. Critics of ENDA have warned
that expanding the bill’s scope will lead to an increase in both valid
and frivolous claims that could create a substantial burden for small
businesses.126 However, the existing data from states that have already
passed legislation prohibiting discrimination based on sexual
orientation and gender identity suggests that this supposed flood of
frivolous discrimination suits has no basis in reality. A recent General
Accountability Office (GAO) report found that these states have seen
no significant increase in litigation since the passage of
antidiscrimination laws.127 The report found that LGBT employees
are bringing discrimination claims under these statutes at
approximately the rate at which employees bring federal claims
under Title VII.128 There is consequently nothing to suggest that a
federal law would have the effect of increasing litigation to the point
of threatening any employer’s ability to stay in business. On the
contrary, the GAO report suggests that state antidiscrimination laws
are in fact serving their intended purpose: to allow LGBT employees
a means of redress for discrimination in the workplace.
Though few argue that gay and transgender employees should be
denied equality in employment, ENDA’s legislative history has been
filled with frustration and compromise. Congress intended the religious
126. In announcing his opposition ENDA, House Speaker John Boehner stated
that the bill “will increase frivolous litigation and cost American jobs, especially small
business jobs.” Spinning ENDA, FACTCHECK.ORG, http://www.factcheck.org/2013/11
/spinning-enda (last updated Nov. 7, 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).
127. By way of an example, California has enacted statutory provisions protecting
against employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender
identity. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12490(a) (West 2014). Of the total 19,839 employment
discrimination complaints filed in 2012, only 1104 contained allegations of
discrimination based on sexual orientation. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
GAO-13-700R, UPDATE ON STATE STATUTES AND ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT DATA ON
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION BASED ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND GENDER IDENTITY 1–
2 & n.4 (2013) (listing the twenty-two states that have enacted legislation against
employment discrimination based on sexual orientation and the eighteen states that have
also added legislation against employment discrimination based on gender identity).
128. See UPDATE ON STATE STATUTES AND ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT DATA, supra
note 127, at 2 (reporting that generally, administrative complaint data collected from
states with laws prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender
identity showed “relatively few employment discrimination complaints” from LGBT
employees (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Spinning ENDA, supra note
126 (debunking John Boehner’s claim that ENDA will burden small businesses by
encouraging frivolous litigation based on the above GAO report and the fact that the
bill exempts employers with fewer than fifteen employees, which account for nearly
90% of small businesses).
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exemption to be a minor exception to the rule created by ENDA, but
the exemption’s excessive scope calls into question Congress’s
commitment to protect the rights of LGBT employees. Congress could
reaffirm this commitment by narrowing the Act’s religious exemption to
allow discrimination against only those employees who qualify as
religious leaders under the ministerial exception.
CONCLUSION
Despite having bipartisan support in Congress, ENDA’s immediate
future remains uncertain thanks to partisan politics that have
impeded its progress in the House of Representatives.129 However,
the broad support and recent momentum behind the bill strongly
suggest that it will become law in the coming years. Though the
passage of ENDA in any form will be a huge step toward guaranteeing
LGBT employees equal rights in the workplace, its overbroad
religious exemption leaves a major gap in coverage for employees of
religious organizations. Congress should amend ENDA’s religious
exemption to apply only to employees who fall under the ministerial
exception established in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church
and School v. E.E.O.C. Though far from a perfect solution, narrowing
ENDA’s religious exemption offers an acceptable balance between
protecting the civil rights of LGBT employees and ensuring the
religious freedom of employers.

129. See supra notes 76–79 and accompanying text (discussing ENDA’s current
status in the House).

